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The present fMRI study investigated whether human observers spontaneously exploit
the statistical structure underlying continuous action sequences. In particular, we tested
whether two different statistical properties can be distinguished with regard to their
neural correlates: an action step’s predictability and its probability. To assess these
properties we used measures from information theory. Predictability of action steps was
operationalized by its inverse, conditional entropy, which combines the number of possible
action steps with their respective probabilities. Probability of action steps was assessed
using conditional surprisal, which increases with decreasing probability. Participants were
trained in an action observation paradigm with video clips showing sequences of 9–33 s
length with varying numbers of action steps that were statistically structured according to
a Markov chain. Behavioral tests revealed that participants implicitly learned this statistical
structure, showing that humans are sensitive toward these probabilistic regularities.
Surprisal (lower probability) enhanced the BOLD signal in the anterior intraparietal sulcus.
In contrast, high conditional entropy, i.e., low predictability, was correlated with higher
activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal gyrus, and posterior intraparietal
sulcus. Furthermore, we found a correlation between the anterior hippocampus’ response
to conditional entropy with the extent of learning, such that the more participants had
learnt the structure, the greater the magnitude of hippocampus activation in response to
conditional entropy. Findings show that two aspects of predictions can be dissociated: an
action’s predictability is reflected in a top-down modulation of attentional focus, evident
in increased fronto-parietal activation. In contrast, an action’s probability depends on the
identity of the stimulus itself, resulting in bottom-up driven processing costs in the parietal
cortex.
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INTRODUCTION
When we observe another person’s action, we are quite accurate
at predicting what is going to happen next (Stadler et al., 2011;
Zacks et al., 2011). But how do we know? Theoretically, we can
be taught that an action A is typically followed by action B, as
for instance when we learn how to bake a cake. However, we can
also acquire knowledge about the structure of action sequences
through statistical learning (Avrahami and Kareev, 1994; Baldwin
et al., 2008). Statistical learning describes amechanism of learning
about associations between events through repeated experience of
their co-occurrence or succession either in time or space (Turk-
Browne et al., 2009; Fiser et al., 2010). Thereby, we learn about
two statistical measures of actions that we can exploit to pre-
dict upcoming steps, given the current action step we observe:
the number of possible action steps and their probabilities. The
number and probability of the alternatively possible action steps
at a particular moment (i.e., the degree of weighted branching
at a node in the action sequence) determines the action’s pre-
dictability, while in contrast to that, an action step’s probability
depends on the particular action step alone. For example, taking
a banana is most often directly followed by peeling it, while tak-
ing an apple can be directly followed by a larger number of action
steps, as, e.g., eating the apple, peeling, or cutting it. So after see-
ing someone grasping a banana, predictability of the next step is
high, as only one action step is highly probable, while predictabil-
ity of the next action step is lower after seeing someone taking
an apple. To keep with the above example, despite the higher
predictability after seeing someone grasping a banana, the prob-
ability of putting the banana in a lunchbox could be the same as
putting an apple in a lunchbox. From a neuroscientific perspec-
tive, a differentiation between the two aspects is crucial: while
an event’s probability reflects how (un-)expected its occurrence
was and hence, how much an observer needs to adapt his previ-
ously built expectations, predictability influences how precise an
observer’s expectations could be.
As this example illustrates, predictability and probability both
quantify the statistical structure of actions, or more generally,
events. While predictability (or its inverse, entropy, cf. Shannon,
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1948) derives from the number of possible events and their
respective probabilities, probability of an event (or its inverse,
surprisal, cf. Tribus, 1961) refers to the event alone. Thus, pre-
dictability of an event can vary independently of its absolute
probability. In actions, predictability is lowest at action bound-
aries (Zacks et al., 2011), depending on the weighted degree of
branching at the node in the action sequence. The independence
of predictability and probability is reflected by the observation
that they differently affect encoding of stimulus streams (Strange
et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bornstein and Daw, 2012).
Various research has provided evidence that people are able
to implicitly learn the statistical structure underlying incom-
ing stimulus streams in both visual as well as auditory mate-
rial (e.g., Hunt and Aslin, 2001; Saffran, 2001; Harrison et al.,
2006; Swallow and Zacks, 2008; Bornstein and Daw, 2012;
Paraskevopoulos et al., 2012; see Perruchet and Pacton, 2006 for
a review). However, so far previous studies on statistical learn-
ing in actions have focused on learning of successions of separate
action clips (Avrahami and Kareev, 1994; Baldwin et al., 2008;
Swallow and Zacks, 2008), while evidence for statistical learning
in dynamic action sequences is still lacking.
Building on this prior work, the goals of this study were
two-fold. First, we aimed at establishing a role of statistical struc-
ture in the perception of continuous action sequences in general.
Second, we wanted to address the question of neural correlates of
predictability and probability of action steps at the current posi-
tion of an action sequence. It has been shown that predictions of
abstract visual events and actions rely in parts on identical brain
sites, but engage also different ones (Schubotz and von Cramon,
2008). As most studies on predictability and probability in event
streamsmade use of abstract visual stimuli, we aimed at extending
knowledge on this further and examine, if the respective networks
overlap or differ in their components.
To be able to dissociate predictability and probability of
actions, we created action sequences according to a first-order
Markov structure. That is, the predictability and probability of
one certain action step depended on the preceding action step,
i.e., they were conditional on their predecessor. We implemented
two distinct measures for each quantity. Effects of action proba-
bility were measured as conditional surprisal, whereas action pre-
dictability was operationalized as conditional entropy (Shannon,
1948; Cover and Thomas, 1991). Conditional entropy combines
the number of possible alternative action steps and their respec-
tive probabilities (for further details, see Materials and Methods
and Figure 1).
We expected to find effects of the conditional surprisal of
an action step in a lateral network often engaged by observing
actions, including the premotor cortex, parietal sites, and the
posterior temporal cortex (Jeannerod, 2001; Schubotz and von
Cramon, 2004, 2008; Caspers et al., 2010). This network, also
referred to as action-observation network, shows an increased
response during the encounter of unexpected actions (Schiffer
et al., 2013) and is furthermore also correlated with the surprisal
of an abstract event (Strange et al., 2005; Bubic et al., 2011).
Hence, we hypothesized activation in the action-observation net-
work to show a higher activation for action steps with a higher
surprisal.
FIGURE 1 | Markov chain ruling the presented action sequences. Rows
depict the first objects of a transition (t - 1), e.g., the board (first row) was
always (p = 1.0) followed by a cube (third column), whereas the cube (third
row) could be followed by a washer (p = 0.25), a short screw (p = 0.50), or
a screw nut (p = 0.25). Conditional surprisal of an action step depended on
its probability given the preceding action step only. An example is
highlighted in the figure: cells surrounded by dotted lines determine the
surprisal assigned to the washer after a screw nut (orange) or a cube (blue).
In contrast, an action step’s conditional entropy depended on its own
probability and the probability weights of alternative action steps. For
instance, cells surrounded by dashed lines determine the conditional
entropy assigned to the washer after the screw nut (orange) or cube (blue).
The degree of predictability of abstract stimuli has been found
to draw on attentional and memory systems (Strange et al., 2005;
Bornstein and Daw, 2012; Nastase et al., 2014), showing higher
activations for less predictable stimuli. In line with this, Schubotz
et al. (2012) found increased activation in left dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (dlPFC), parahippocampal gyrus, and posterior
angular gyrus (AG) when observers noticed an action bound-
ary in everyday actions (i.e., when predictability was low), and
interpreted this as reflecting a shift of spatial attention that is
guided by long-term action knowledge. However, this study did
not address quantified predictability that results from the num-
ber and probability-balance of possible upcoming action steps.
First evidence for a quantitative effect of the number of prob-
able actions has been provided by Schiffer et al. (2012), who
found an increase of activity in the hippocampal formation as the
number of possible action steps increased and hence, predictabil-
ity decreased. Based on these previous findings, we hypothesized
activation in the hippocampal formation and the AG to corre-
late with predictability of observed action steps. Predictability
was measured as conditional entropy, which is the inverse of pre-
dictability. Thus, we expected a positive correlation of the BOLD
signal with conditional entropy. In psychological terms, condi-
tional entropy can also be translated as conflict or uncertainty,
as both rise, as more possible and probability-balanced alterna-
tives are at hand (cf. Berlyne, 1957). Research on response conflict
as well as on decisional uncertainty suggests a role of the pos-
terior dorsomedial frontal cortex in adapting behavior to such
situations (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Volz et al., 2005; Mushtaq
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et al., 2011). We thus hypothesized activation in the dorsome-
dial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) to be positively correlated with
the conditional entropy of upcoming actions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen healthy right-handed participants volunteered in the
fMRI study [mean age 25 (20–34) years, eight female, 14 stu-
dents]. They were recruited from the volunteer database of the
Max-Planck-Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Science.
No participant reported a psychiatric or neurological disorder.
They gave written informed consent and received a financial
reimbursement of 10C per hour. The local Ethics Committee of
the University of Leipzig approved the experimental standards.
Two volunteers had to be excluded, one due to technical difficul-
ties and one due to poor performance in the control task (score
below two standard deviations from mean) and self-reported
periods of sleep (results did not change qualitatively if participant
was included in analysis). All following analyses of functional and
behavioral data are thus based on data from 15 participants [eight
female, mean age 25 (20–34) years].
STIMULUS MATERIAL
The stimulus material consisted of videos showing sequences
of action steps using objects of the constructional toy Baufix®
(Figure 1). Overall, six different objects were used: a board, a
cube, a long screw, a short screw, a nut, and a washer. An
action step was defined as the grasping and mounting of one
object. Each object was always manipulated in the same way:
the cube was screwed on the scaffold, the long screw was put
through a hole of a board, washer and boards were placed on
long screws, screw-nuts were attached to screws, and short screws
were screwed into cubes. Action steps were performed in a nat-
uralistic manner and hence differed in their length and speed
of movement.
Videos showed sequences comprised of varying combinations
and numbers of these six action steps. The transitions between
action steps followed a Markov chain (see Figure 1) and were
the same for all subjects. Transition probabilities between action
steps were pre-defined and ranged from p = 0.25 to p = 1. Except
mounting of the cube, which was always preceded by the same
action step, each action step was preceded by one out of two
to three different action steps and depending on the preceding
action step, one, two or three different action steps were con-
currently possible, causing different values of conditional entropy
and surprisal (see section “Contrast Specification”). Importantly,
this statistical structure enabled us to disentangle values of con-
ditional entropy and surprisal from identity of action steps and
involved objects, as well as the characteristics of the action steps
as speed of movement and length of manipulation. Repetitions
of action steps within a sequence were possible but were not
correlated significantly with our measures of interest (correla-
tion with conditional entropy r = 0.03, correlation with con-
ditional surprisal r = −0.12). Direct repetitions of action steps
did not occur. To implement the Markov chain, 74 construction
sequences were compiled. Action sequences differed in the num-
ber of action steps they comprised, ranging from three to seven
(M = 4.89, SD = 1.28), and their overall presentation duration
(M = 20.12 s, SD = 6.04). Note that constructions did not aim
to reach a specific, pre-defined overarching goal, as for instance
building a vehicle.
Overall, each action step was presented about 60 times (58–
63, M = 60.33), so that all action steps had a comparable base
rate. We moreover balanced how often an action step emerged as
the first or the last step of a construction sequence (first: 10–15,
M = 12.5; last: 10–15,M = 12.33).
To have ample degrees of freedom for the construction process,
the first action step was always performed on a prepared “start-
ing” scaffold consisting of various different mounted objects (as
can be seen in Figure 2). Sequences started at the moment the
actor lifted the scaffold and ended when the scaffold was placed
on the table again. In sum, five different starting scaffolds were
employed. Each of the 74 action sequences was filmed once with
each of these five scaffolds (resulting in 370 videos altogether),
so that participants never saw the exact same shot of one action
sequence twice. Hence, expectations within action sequences
could only be based on the employed transition probabilities
between action steps.
Videos were filmed from the third person perspective with
no zooms or camera motions. The focus was on the center of
the table and offered a good view of the actor’s hands, but not
the head, and numerous different objects in the foreground (see
Figure 2). The software iMovie ′09 (Apple, Inc., Cupertino, CA)
was used for video processing.
Randomization of order of the sequences during the exper-
iment was constrained by allowing maximal two repetitions of
the used scaffold, the sequence length as well as the first and last
element of the sequence. Additionally, the cases of the former
sequence being a subsequence of the latter and vice versa were
excluded.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The experiment took place on three successive days. The first
two sessions served as training to provide participants with
implicit knowledge of the underlying statistical structure of the
action sequences. On the third day, participants first underwent
the fMRI experiment. Afterwards, they took part in two post-
tests, which tested their implicit knowledge of the action syntax.
The experiment was programmed and run on Presentation 12.0
(Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA, USA).
TRAINING SESSIONS (DAY 1 AND 2)
During each of the two 35-min training sessions, participants
were exposed once to each of the 74 sequences. Participants were
exposed to a different randomization of movies in each training
session.
Participants were instructed to watch the videos carefully and
to answer the occasional questions concerning the previous video.
Questions appeared after 36 of the 74 video clips (48%). It is
important to note that participants did not receive explicit learn-
ing instructions at any point of the training (or the subsequent
fMRI session), nor were they told that there was a certain system-
atic concerning the statistical structure of the action sequences.
No cover story was provided.
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental course and exemplary distribution of
conditional entropy and conditional surprisal during an action
sequence. A fixation circle announced each video and 48% of the videos
were followed by a two alternative forced choice question. Feedback on
correctness of responses was only given during the training sessions.
Within each action sequence, values of conditional entropy and conditional
surprisal were ascribed to the action steps, depending on the preceding
action step.
Before starting the training, participants were familiarized
with the six different objects as well as with the possible ques-
tions (e.g., “Has a long screw been used?”). During training,
participants had to press the right mouse button (i.e., mid-
dle finger of the right hand) corresponding to the answer
“no” and the left mouse button (i.e., right index finger) corre-
sponding to “yes.” Half of the questions required an affirmative
answer.
The videos were displayed in front of a gray background
in the middle of a computer screen (subtending approximately
12.5∗10◦ of visual angle). A fixation circle announced videos
for 3 s (or variable length after question trials; see Figure 2
for an illustration of the trial course). Questions were pre-
sented for 3 s or until the first response; after question trials,
the duration of the fixation circle was adapted to compen-
sate for different reaction times (with keeping a minimum
duration of 2 s). Questions were followed by a feedback of
2 s indicating correct (“+”), incorrect (“−”), or delayed (“/”)
responses.
FUNCTIONAL MRI SESSION (DAY 3)
The task in the fMRI session was identical to the training sessions,
except that no feedback was provided. Participants were informed
about this difference beforehand.
In addition to the experimental block, we ran four func-
tional localizers adapted from Wurm and Schubotz (2012) after
the main experiment so as to identify brain regions related
to the processing of Baufix® objects, other tools, motion,
and human body (see Supplemental Material for Analysis and
Results).
Following the functional scanning, two post-tests assessed par-
ticipants’ implicit knowledge of the action syntax. During the
first post-test, a paper–pencil test, six video clips were presented
in randomized order. These clips ended after one object had
been used and the actor reached for a second one. The partic-
ipants’ task was to mark those objects out of the possible six
that they expected to be used next and to indicate their respec-
tive probability. To this end, they had to assign overall eight
crosses among the six items. For instance, if participants saw a
clip in which the long screw had been used and they expected
the board and the short screw afterwards with equal probabil-
ity, they assigned four crosses to each of them. The number of
eight crosses was chosen to allow participants to select up to all
six possible objects and to weight them accurately (each cross
corresponded to p = 0.125). In the second post-test, participants
were presented each possible succession of two of the six objects
and were asked to enter a value between 0 and 100% repre-
senting how likely they considered each succession with regard
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to the previously seen videos. Responses were given via key-
board, and participants could revise their answer before finally
submitting it.
After completing the post-tests, participants were interviewed
to further assess if they have consciously noticed the statistical
structure of the presented action sequences and if so, to which
degree they were able to specify the structure. To this end, they
were asked verbally if they have noticed any associations between
the action steps and if so, if they could define them. Furthermore,
they were asked if the actions were predictable for them.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
The statistical analysis of the two post-tests was performed with
SPSS Statistics version 20.0 (SPSS Inc. Chicago, Illinois, USA). An
α-level of 0.05 was defined as statistical threshold.
First, we aggregated separately for each post-test for each par-
ticipant the estimated probabilities of the transitions, depending
on the underlying level of implemented probabilities (0, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, or 1.0), e.g., we calculated the average estimated
probability for all transitions with the same true probability.
Those aggregated probability estimates were entered in a separate
repeated measures analysis of variance (RM-ANOVA) with the
factor PROBABILITY (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.0) for each post-test.
When the assumption of sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used to adjust the degrees of freedom.
FUNCTIONAL DATA ANALYSIS
Contrast specifications
Predictability of action steps was manipulated by the number
of possible next action steps and their respective probabilities.
Conditional entropy (H) provides a measure that takes both
aspects into account and is higher, the lower the predictabil-
ity is. In contrast, probability of the factually occurring action
step was modeled as conditional surprise (I, surprisal hereafter,
cf. Tribus, 1961), which is the negative logarithm of an action
step’s probability. The applied modeling of conditional entropy
and conditional surprisal was in close proximity to the approach
taken by previous studies (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison et al.,
2006; Bornstein and Daw, 2012; Schiffer et al., 2012).
Conditional entropy and surprisal are only partially statis-
tically independent, because the probability of a single action
step decreases as the number of possible action steps increases.
The advantage of modeling correlated parameters simultaneously
in one general linear model (GLM) is that any variance that is
explained by both parameters will not be erroneously assigned to
exclusively one of them. At the same time, this approach has the
disadvantage that it does not show areas that are truly modulated
by both conditional entropy and surprisal. That is, commonali-
ties will be underestimated (false negatives). To avoid this latter
fallacy, we additionally tested for effects of conditional entropy
and conditional surprisal by employing a separate design for
each and provide results in the Supplementary Materials. Both
approaches resulted in similar results, but showed also some
differences.
Calculating probabilities: Bayesian modeling approach
We modeled the neural responses according to an ideal observer
model, which tracks the number of occurrences of events and
calculates probabilities based on all occurrences (cf. Strange et al.,
2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bornstein and Daw, 2012; Schiffer
et al., 2012). Hence, the probability p of a single item xt was cal-
culated as the number of occurrences n of item xt divided by the
sum of all items xi that have appeared so far (see Equation 1). The
addition of the value 1 shapes a Dirichlet function.
p (xt) = n(xt) + 1∑
i xi + 1
Equation 1. Calculation of Bayesian probabilities.
The ideal observer model included the training sessions, so
transition probabilities were already taken as established at the
beginning of the fMRI session. Since all action steps had a simi-
lar base rate, we did not calculate the surprisal of the occurrence
of an action step per se, i.e., p(xt). Instead, we calculated the con-
ditional surprisal ascribed to a transition, i.e., the occurrence of
an action step, given that a particular action step had happened
before, p(xt |xt − 1) (Equation 2). Values for surprisal ranged from
0.01 to 1.38 (M = 0.63, SD = 0.49).
I (xt |xt − 1) = −log p (xt |xt − 1)
Equation 2. Calculation of conditional surprisal.
In analogy, we did not calculate the entropy ascribed to the
underlying Markov chain of the action sequences, but focused
on the specific conditional entropy (Cover and Thomas, 1991).
Conditional entropy refers to the entropy ascribed to an upcom-
ing event when the prior event is taken into account. It describes
the (on average) expected surprise. It is calculated as mean sur-
prise of all possible events xt given that xt − 1 had occurred, stan-
dardized on the probability of the prior event p(xt − 1) (Equation
3). Values ranged from 0.01 to 0.72 (M = 0.11, SD = 0.05).
Correlation of both parameters was r = 0.67.
H (xt |xt − 1) = −p (xt − 1)
∑
i
p
(
xit |xt − 1
)
∗ log p
(
xit |xt − 1
)
Equation 3. Calculation of conditional entropy.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
A 3 T Siemens Magnetom Trio (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany)
system equipped with a standard birdcage headcoil was used in
the functional imaging session. Participants lay supine in the
scanner with their right hand on a four-button response-box
and their index and middle finger placed on the two appropri-
ate response buttons. Response contingencies were the same as in
the training sessions. Form-fitting cushions were used to prevent
participants from head or arm movements and they were pro-
vided with earplugs to attenuate scanner noise. The experiment
was presented via a mirror that was built into the headcoil and
adjusted individually to provide a good view of the entire screen.
Prior to functional imaging, 28 slices of anatomical T1-
weighted MDEFT images (4mm thickness, 0.6mm spacing) and
a fieldmap scan, consisting of a gradient-echo readout with 24
echoes and an inter-echo time of 0.95ms, were acquired. During
functional imaging, 28 axial slices (126.8mm field of view, 4mm
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thickness, 0.6mm spacing; in-plane resolution of 3 × 3mm) par-
allel to the bi-commissural line (AC-PC) were collected using a
single-shot gradient echo-planar (EPI) sequence (2000ms rep-
etition time; echo time 30ms, flip angle 90◦, serial recording),
sensitive to BOLD contrast.
To improve the localization of activation foci, high-resolution
3D T1-weighted whole brain MDEFT sequences (175 sagittal
slices, 1mm thickness) were recorded for each participant in a
separate session.
Functional data were processed using the LIPSIA software
package, version 2.1 (Lohmann et al., 2001). First, a distortion
correction using the field map scan was performed. To correct
for temporal offsets between the slices acquired in one scan, a
cubic-spline interpolation was used. Thereafter the data were
motion-corrected with the 50th time-step as reference and six
degrees of freedom (three rotational, three translational). A high-
pass filter of 1/70 or 1/55Hz (different between participants)
was applied to remove low-frequency signal changes and baseline
drifts. Highpass filter width was determined by an optimization
algorithm implemented in the LIPSIA package.
Functional data slices were aligned with a 3D stereotactic
coordinate system. To that end, in a first step the matching
parameters (six degrees of freedom, three rotational, three trans-
lational) of the T1-weighted 2D-MDEFT data onto the individual
3D-MDEFT reference set were calculated. The thereby gained
transformation matrix for a rigid spatial registration was nor-
malized to a standardized Talairach brain size (x = 135, y = 175,
z = 120mm; Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) by linear scaling.
Thereafter the normalized transformation matrices were applied
to the functional slices, in order to transform them using tri-
linear interpolation and align them with the 3D-reference set in
the stereotactic coordinate system. After the described process-
ing, the spatial resolution of the functional data was 3 ∗ 3 ∗ 3mm
(27mm3). A spatial Gaussian filter of 5.65mm full width at half
maximum (FWHM) and a standard deviation of 0.8mm was
applied to the data.
Design specifications
Wemodeled the parametric contrasts of conditional surprisal and
conditional entropy time-locked to the beginning of a new action
step. Onsets were defined as the starting of the hand movement to
the next object. If two events were separated by less than 2 s (i.e.,
less than one TR), only the first one was included in the GLM,
while the second was ignored and treated as part of the implicit
baseline. To control for variance due to action observation in gen-
eral, we also modeled the video clips as epochs (mixed design).
The parametric contrasts of conditional entropy and conditional
surprisal contained 219 events with a mean difference between
events of 7.93 s (5.01 s SD), which were selected from 74 video
epochs.
The statistical evaluation was based on the least-square estima-
tion using the GLM for serially auto-correlated observations and a
temporal Gaussian filter with a FWHM of 4 s was applied to deal
with auto-correlation (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley and Friston,
1995).
To calculate the parametric effects of conditional surprisal and
conditional entropy, the design matrix was generated with a delta
function and its first derivative, convolved with the hemody-
namic response function (gamma function) (Glover, 1999). The
BOLD signal was analyzed time-locked to the specific events. The
design matrix included six regressors: one for the main effect of
action onsets with an amplitude of one, one for the parametric
effect of conditional entropy, one for conditional surprisal, with
an amplitude according to the respective measure, and two each
with an amplitude of one for question trials and video epochs.
The duration of action steps was included as a regressor of no
interest. Besides the video epochs and the question trials, all
events were modeled with a duration of 1 s. Question trials were
modeled with a duration of 3 s and video epochs were modeled
with the duration of the respective video clip. The model equa-
tion consisted of the observed data, the design matrix, and the
error-term.
For each participant, contrast images were generated, which
consisted of beta-value estimates of the raw-score differences
between experimental conditions. Subsequently, the individual
contrast images were entered into a second-level random effects
analysis. Here, one-sample t-tests across the contrast images of
the 15 participants were performed to test the observed dif-
ferences for significant deviations from zero. The t-values were
transformed afterwards into z-scores.
We corrected for multiple comparisons by applying a two-
step correction approach. An initial z-threshold of 2.33 (p < 0.01,
one-tailed) was defined in the first step. All voxels showing a posi-
tive activation above this threshold entered the second step of the
correction. Here, a Monte Carlo simulation was used to define
thresholds for cluster-size and cluster-value at a significance level
of p < 0.05 (one-tailed). The combination of cluster size and
cluster value decreases the risk of neglecting true activations in
small structures. Thus, all reported activations were significant at
p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level.
ROI analysis
To test for activations in the anterior hippocampus, we performed
an additional region of interest (ROI) analysis for conditional
entropy. The ROI in the left anterior hippocampus was defined
by averaging coordinates of peak activation reported in previous
studies on predictability of sequences of visual stimuli (Strange
et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2006; Bornstein and Daw, 2012);
coordinates for the ROI in the right anterior hippocampus were
derived from the study by Strange and colleagues. Center of the
ROI in the left anterior hippocampus was at x = −25, y = −16,
z = −18, center of the ROI in the right anterior hippocampus was
at x = 31, y = −17, z = −19. Both ROIs had a sphere of six adja-
cent voxels. One-sample t-tests were calculated over beta-values
per participant and ROI to test for significant deviations from
zero.
Additionally, we tested post-hoc for correlation between beta-
values derived from the parametric contrast of conditional
entropy and the degree of familiarity with the statistical struc-
ture as assessed by the two post-tests. We quantified the degree of
familiarity with the statistical structure separately for both post-
tests as difference between the maximal probability judgment
(100 for the computer and 8 for the paper–pencil post-test) and
the average absolute deviation of the probability judgments (pˆ)
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from the implemented probabilities (p) (Equation 4).
Familiarity = pmax − 1
n
∑
n
|pˆn − pn|
Equation 4. Calculation of the degree of familiarity with the sta-
tistical structure. Parameter pˆ describes participants’ probability
judgments, parameter p the implemented probabilities of the dif-
ferent transitions (n) and pmax the maximal judgment in the
respective test (with a value of 100 for the computer and 8 for
the paper–pencil post-test).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
During the fMRI, participants answered on average 34.47 out
of 36 questions correctly (SD = 1.77). One participant answered
only 30 questions correctly (z-value<−2) andwas excluded from
all further analyses.
In order to assess whether participants learned the
statistical structure of the actions, two post-tests were
conducted.
Regarding the paper–pencil post-test, two participants had
to be excluded from analyses, as they were erroneously pre-
sented only five instead of six objects. For the remaining par-
ticipants, the RM-ANOVA on the estimated probabilities was
significant [F(1.69, 20.26) = 19.52, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62]. Planned
comparisons between the different levels yielded significant dif-
ferences between the levels of 1.0 and 0.75 [t(12) = 2.50, p =
0.014, one-tailed] and the levels of 0.50 and 0.25 [t(12) =
6.56, p < 0.001, one-tailed; see Table 1 for means and standard
deviations].
The RM-ANOVA on the estimated probabilities of the com-
puter post-test was also significant [F(2.43, 34.05) = 26.90, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.66]. Two out of four planned comparisons between
the different levels of probability reached significance: 1.0 vs.
0.75 [t(14) = 3.36, p = 0.003, one-tailed] and 0.50 vs. 0.25
[t(14) = 6.1, p < 0.001, one-tailed; see Table 1 for means and
standard deviations of the five levels, Figure 3 for a graphical
display].
Together, both post-tests consistently showed that participants
rated transitions with higher probabilities as more likely, while
they were not able to exactly distinguish between each probability
level.
Table 1 | Descriptive results of the two post-tests, separately for the
five levels of implemented probabilities.
Implemented Distributed crosses in Estimated percentages in
probability paper–pencil post-test: computer post-test:
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
0 0.95 (0.22) 22.03 (7.76)
0.25 0.86 (0.46) 22.77 (9.35)
0.50 2.79 (0.70) 44.12 (11.10)
0.75 2.65 (1.20) 44.17 (17.81)
1.0 4.54 (2.33) 59.80 (23.74)
IMAGING RESULTS
Parametric effects of conditional surprisal
Assessing parametric effects of conditional surprisal revealed a
positive correlation in the bilateral anterior intraparietal sulcus
(see Figure 4A and Figure S3 for additional sagittal views; a
comprehensive list of activations and Talairach coordinates are
provided in Table 2, see Table S5 for MNI coordinates).
Parametric effects of conditional entropy
We found a positive correlation of conditional entropy with
BOLD response in the right lateral and medial orbitofrontal
cortex (lOFC and mOFC, hereafter), dmPFC, bilateral inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), bilateral anterior dorsal insulae, and right
posterior intraparietal sulcus (pIPS) (see Figure 4B); a compre-
hensive list of activations and Talairach coordinates are provided
in Table 2, see Table S5 for MNI coordinates.
ROI analysis
No significant hippocampal activation was revealed by the ROI
analysis (all p > 0.4; see Table 3 for descriptive statistics of beta
weights). The post-hoc correlation analysis revealed a signifi-
cant positive correlation between familiarity with the statistical
structure, measured as average deviation from the implemented
probabilities (see Equation 4), in both ROIs when familiarity
was assessed with the computer post-test (all p < 0.05), but
not when it was assessed with the paper–pencil post-test (all
p > 0.33, see Table 4). This correlation indicates that activation
in the hippocampal ROIs was the stronger positively correlated
with conditional entropy, the better participants had learnt the
statistical structure of the action sequences.
DISCUSSION
From a stochastic point of view, the course of an action can be
conceived of as a run through a decision tree: one step follows
another with a certain probability while more or less alternative
FIGURE 3 | Results of the two post-tests. As one cross in the
paper–pencil post-test corresponded to 12.5% in the computer post-test,
results of the paper–pencil post-test were multiplied with the factor 12.5, to
make participants’ probability judgments in the two post-tests more
comparable. Error bars display ± 1 SD.
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FIGURE 4 | Areas showing a positive correlation with (A)
conditional surprisal and (B) conditional entropy. ant dIns,
anterior dorsal insula; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; IFG,
inferior frontal gyrus; lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; pIPS,
posterior intraparietal sulcus; PMv, ventral premotor cortex; aIPS,
anterior parietal sulcus.
action steps are possible. In the present fMRI study we assumed
that an action’s statistical structure is reflected in the brain activ-
ity of the action observer. In particular, we aimed at deciphering
two distinct aspects of the statistical structure that may influ-
ence processing of action steps. First, the load of this processing
varies as a function of the action step’s absolute probability at
the point of the sequence, and hence unexpectedness or condi-
tional surprisal. Second, the observed action step is more or less
predictable, depending on the degree of branching of the deci-
sion tree at the considered action boundary and the probability
weights of these different branches. This latter characteristic can
be quantified as conditional entropy, which is higher, the less
predictable an upcoming action step is.
We employed an ideal Bayesian observer model and analyzed
the BOLD response for (1) the conditional surprisal and (2) the
conditional entropy at beginnings of action steps. We found acti-
vation in the aIPS to positively correlate with an action step’s
conditional surprisal. For conditional entropy, we expected a
positive correlation with activity of the AG, the hippocampal for-
mation, and the dmPFC.We found activation in the right dmPFC
and in the pIPS, close to the AG. No effect in the hippocampal
formation was found. Instead, activity also increased with condi-
tional entropy in the right lOFC and the bilateral anterior dorsal
insulae. Findings will be discussed in detail below.
BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS: PARTICIPANTS’ AWARENESS OF
PROBABILISTIC ACTION STRUCTURE
A post-fMRI survey revealed that participants had little awareness
of the probabilistic structure of the actions. However, they were
able to report those pairwise associations between the action steps
with highest transition probabilities (board–cube, short screw–
long screw, washer–screw nut). No participant reported having
noticed the different probabilities or degrees of predictability.
Still, the two post-tests showed that participants implicitly learned
the transition probabilities, as more likely transitions were judged
to occur with a higher probability than less likely transitions.
These judgments delivered in a computer test were moreover
confirmed in a subsequent paper–pencil test, in which more
likely transitions were selected more often than less likely tran-
sitions. Behavioral data indicate that the probabilistic structure of
observed action is acquired and retrieved during action observa-
tion, even if not explicitly attended or consciously perceived.
The present findings add up to studies on statistical learning
in actions (Avrahami and Kareev, 1994; Baldwin et al., 2008).
Previous findings suggested that human observers can distinguish
between random and deterministic transitions between distinct
video clips showing object manipulations or movie excerpts.
Our results indicate that human observers are also sensitive to
statistical structure within continuous action sequences; further-
more, they are able to distinguish between different degrees of
transition probabilities between action steps. This means that
human observers can detect meaningful segments within uniform
streams of actions based on statistical information. Critically, we
did not distinguish between transitions between objects and tran-
sitions between object manipulations. Further studies should test
for potential differences in effects of transition probabilities.
CONDITIONAL SURPRISAL: PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT ENGAGEMENT
OF THE ANTERIOR INTRAPARIETAL SULCUS
Expectations can serve as a filter for sensory input, inasmuch
as everything that accords to the expectations is largely unin-
formative. By filtering on an early stimulus processing level,
unexpected and hence informative sensory signals get more
accentuated (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; Friston and Kiebel,
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2009; Summerfield and Egner, 2009). This results in greater neu-
ral activity for unexpected events compared to expected events in
stimulus- and task-relevant brain areas. As observing actions is
known to engage the lateral network of premotor cortex, parietal
sites, and posterior temporal cortex (Jeannerod, 2001; Schubotz
Table 2 | Talairach coordinates and maximal z-scores of significantly
activated voxels for the parametric contrasts of conditional surprisal
and conditional entropy (combined GLM approach).
Localization Talairach z-values,
coordinates local maxima
x y z
CONDITIONAL SURPRISAL
Anterior intraparietal
sulcus/postcentral gyrus
55 −24 39 4.28
−59 −27 36 3.08
CONDITIONAL ENTROPY
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 1 24 45 4.43
Postcentral gyrus −47 −18 54 3.96
Anterior dorsal insula 31 18 6 5.15
−29 21 9 5.28
Posterior intraparietal sulcus 40 −48 33 3.51
Inferior frontal sulcus/ventral
premotor cortex
−44 21 27 4.24
Anterior cingulate cortex −5 15 24 3.65
Middle frontal gyrus 22 48 21 3.54
Posterior superior temporal
sulcus
40 −48 33 3.51
−47 −45 27 2.86
Inferior colliculi 1 −39 −6 4.21
Lateral temporo-occipital cortex 34 −81 9 3.29
Dorsal medial thalamus −11 6 6 3.14
Cuneus −23 −90 3 3.67
Medial orbitofrontal cortex 16 39 −9 3.55
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 31 36 −12 3.43
−29 3 −12 3.74
Table 3 | Results of the ROI analyses in the left and right anterior
hippocampus to test for effects of conditional entropy.
Region t df p (two-tailed) Mean SD
Right hippocampus −0.23 14 0.82 −0.05 0.85
Left hippocampus −0.86 14 0.40 −0.15 0.66
and von Cramon, 2004; Caspers et al., 2010), we expected effects
of conditional surprisal of an action step to be found here.
Importantly, all action steps in the present study had an equal base
rate, so that effects were not due to unexpectedness of the action
step per se. Rather, we tested if expectations can be built based on
transition probabilities between action steps. If so, action steps
with a higher conditional surprisal should accordingly elicit a
higher BOLD response in the action-observation network, as they
were comparatively unexpected at that very point in time, and the
conveyed information would not have been selectively filtered in
advance (Schiffer et al., 2013).
We found enhanced BOLD response for unexpected action
steps in the aIPS. The anterior portion of the IPS has been sup-
posed to be the homolog to area AIP in macaques, which is
sensitive to size, shape, and orientation of objects (Grefkes and
Fink, 2005). In humans, it is proposed to deal with processing
of tactile and visual object properties (Grefkes and Fink, 2005)
and has been related to the online control of grasping and cod-
ing for goals in actions (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006; Tunik et al.,
2007). Furthermore, aIPS together with temporo-occipital sites
and the premotor cortex forms a network which is most com-
monly activated during action observation (Caspers et al., 2010).
In accordance with current accounts of predictive coding dur-
ing action observation, processing in this network is hierarchical
(Kilner et al., 2007), meaning that information about object prop-
erties is fed forward from temporo-occipital sites to aIPS and
from there to the premotor cortex. While activation in PMv and
temporo-occipital cortex was modulated by conditional entropy
of action steps, activation in aIPS covaried with unexpectedness of
action steps. We suggest that increased activation in the aIPS for
unexpected action steps reflect a revision of the previously built
sensorimotor forward model of the expected manipulation of the
object.
Given that we found the expected covariation with condi-
tional surprisal of an observed object manipulation in the aIPS,
it remains unclear why there was no such effect in earlier visual
areas. It is possible that the statistical structure was not assigned to
the relation between successively manipulated objects, but rather
between successively performed action steps, i.e., a compound of
object and its manipulation. A revision of the built forwardmodel
should draw to a larger extend on aIPS than temporo-occipital
areas. In line with this, Schubotz and von Cramon (2008) found
activation of aIPS in a switching paradigm particularly then when
both the goal of an action as well as the involved object remained
the same, while it did not reach significance anymore when one
of the two changed. The aIPS was the only component of the
action observation network that showed this activation pattern,
Table 4 | Results of the correlational analysis between participants’ knowledge of the statistical structure and beta-values derived from
hippocampal ROIs.
Region Computer post-test Paper–pencil post-test
t df p (two-tailed) r t df p (two-tailed) r
Right hippocampus 3.80 13 0.002 0.73 −0.30 11 0.772 −0.09
Left hippocampus 2.22 13 0.045 0.52 −1.02 11 0.331 −0.29
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while PMv was also significantly active when the goal of an action
changed and temporo-occipital sites when changes of objects
occurred. Thus, aIPS seems to be specifically sensitive to the com-
pound of objects and their associated manipulations. It should
be noticed that participants were instructed to answer questions
regarding the used objects, rather than the different manipula-
tions. Though we cannot conclude for sure that the observed
effects relate to action observation rather than object observation,
activation in the aIPS suggests that attention was nevertheless
directed at the action step as a whole, instead of focusing on the
objects alone.
Alternatively, the revealed effect of conditional surprisal could
also be explained using the concept of expectation attenuation.
Expectation attenuation describes a reduced neural response to an
expected compared to an unexpected stimulus (Den Ouden et al.,
2010; Todorovic and de Lange, 2012). It is comparable to effects of
repetition suppression, but in contrast to this, it does not rely on
direct repetitions of stimuli, but expectations based on memory.
Our findings coincide also with results reported by Strange et al.
(2005). The authors presented sequences of visual stimuli while
participants had to respond to each stimulus by a correspond-
ing button press. They found that activation in posterior fusiform
gyrus and aIPS increased with increasing stimulus-induced sur-
prisal. In contrast to the present study, the degree of surprisal
in the study by Strange and coworkers depended on the over-
all probability of one stimulus to occur, i.e., its base-rate, and
not on the current probability of a stimulus given the preced-
ing one. Notably, since stimulus identity and required responses
were not separated in the study by Strange and colleagues, their
findings cannot clearly distinguish if the revealed neural response
to stimuli with a higher surprisal reflects revision of prepared
responses or revision of anticipated stimuli. In the present study,
participants did neither have to respond to single action steps nor
where they instructed to attend to the structure of the sequences.
Higher activation of the aIPS for action steps with higher sur-
prisal thus suggests that it also engages in predictive processes
during passive observation of actions. Together, present findings
and findings by Strange and colleagues indicate that the aIPS
might be sensitive to the degree of surprisal in both dynamic as
well as static visual sequences. Future work is needed to clarify if it
is particularly sensitive to base-rate dependent surprisal of events,
conditional surprisal, or both and how the effects are modulated
by participants’ task.
A possible alternative interpretation of activation patterns
revealed by conditional surprisal in the present study would hold
that it merely reflect visual processes. Possibly, participants used
their knowledge of the most probable next object to focus their
attention on it before action onset. In cases of surprising action
steps, attention then would have to be withdrawn from the previ-
ously attended object and reoriented to the actually grasped one.
Attentional reorienting, as for example necessary in the Posner
paradigm, has been shown to correlate with activation in the
superior temporal lobe and the inferior parietal cortex (Vossel
et al., 2006). Accordingly, the correlation between conditional
surprisal and aIPS activation may reflect attentional reorienting
rather than revisal of anticipated action steps. However, this inter-
pretation is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, during all movie
scenes presented in the current study, numerous exemplars of
the different objects were concurrently visible, so that focus-
ing attention on only one exemplar seems a highly implausible
strategy. Secondly, the aIPS effect was specific for surprisal and
did not overlap with any activation correlated with conditional
entropy. If it would reflect necessity of attentional withdrawal,
aIPS should be also modulated by the degree of conditional
entropy, since conditional entropy describes how likely a shift of
attention will be.
To sum up, finding activity in the aIPS to increase with a prob-
abilistic mismatch between expected and observed action is in line
with previous research showing it together with posterior tempo-
ral and premotor cortex to be activated when observed actions
violate the observer’s expectations (Schubotz and von Cramon,
2008; Schiffer et al., 2013) as well as when abstract visual stim-
uli elicit surprise (Strange et al., 2005; Bubic et al., 2011). The
present results extend our knowledge on mechanisms underly-
ing action observation by showing that expectations regarding
upcoming action steps are constantly built and adapted during
sequences of actions, even if not relevant for a task, and that the
sensorimotor network is moreover sensitive to the strength of an
observer’s current expectations.
CONDITIONAL ENTROPY: PREDICTABILITY OF ACTION STEPS
Predictability can be viewed as the backdrop on which an occur-
ring action step is processed. Thus, two action steps can be equally
expected (in terms of their absolute probability), but for one
action step, only one alternative action step exists (so that over-
all predictability is high) whereas for the other action step, several
alternative action steps are concurrently possible (so that overall
predictability is low). Accordingly, predictability is influenced by
the number and the probabilities of all alternatives at a given point
in an action.
We used conditional entropy to quantify action predictabil-
ity, combining the number of possible action steps and their
respective probabilities. Conditional entropy is the inverse of pre-
dictability, i.e., it is higher, the lower the predictability is. Several
of our hypotheses, but not all, were confirmed by the data.
As expected, we found that high conditional entropy (and
hence low predictability) of the next action step correlated pos-
itively with the BOLD response in the dmPFC, as well as anterior
dorsal insulae, and lateral prefrontal cortex. Activation of the
dmPFC, together with the anterior dorsal insula, is often found
to increase during decision-making under uncertainty (Huettel
et al., 2005; Volz et al., 2005; Preuschoff, 2008), also when uncer-
tainty is unrelated to a possible outcome but affects a percep-
tual decision (Grinband et al., 2006; Summerfield et al., 2011).
Uncertainty can be due to two factors; one is a lack of knowl-
edge of the rules which describe the relation between events, also
referred to as internally attributed uncertainty, the other is due
to non-deterministic, i.e., probabilistic, relations between events,
so that even when the rules which describe their relation are per-
fectly known, a perfect prediction of the upcoming event is not
feasible. The latter type is also referred to as externally attributed
uncertainty (Volz et al., 2005). Externally attributed uncertainty
is induced by conditional entropy, as both rise as the number of
possible events as well as the balance of their (reward) probability
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increases (Hirsh et al., 2012). It has been proposed that anterior
dorsal insula sub-serves a translation from unspecific drive states
to concrete action plans when uncertainty is high (Wager and
Feldman Barrett, 2004). For an actor, uncertain situations call for
preparation of alternative actions and a flexible shifting between
action plans. In the present study, we suggest that a similar cop-
ing strategy may apply to action observers: if conditional entropy
of an upcoming action step was high, this led to recollection of
the known alternative action steps and the readiness to flexibly
shift between them in the course of action analysis, reflected in
an increased BOLD response in anterior insula. Please note that
since we only manipulated the degree of conditional entropy of
the statistical structure underlying the action sequences and did
not assess participants experienced uncertainty or asked them
to engage in predictions, it remains speculative whether insular
activation is an indicator of participants’ feeling of uncertainty.
We suggest that physiological processes associated with conscious
coping with uncertainty (as, for example, during decision mak-
ing) and those triggered by observing action steps with high
conditional probability might partially overlap.
Notably, in contrast to our findings, Bornstein and Daw (2012)
found a linear negative, not positive, relation between conditional
entropy and activation in the anterior insula as well as the pre-
frontal cortex. Furthermore, Tobia et al. (2012) reported that the
response profile of the insula to entropy could be best explained
by a step-down function. That is, the authors found that insu-
lar activation was higher when entropy levels were within the
lower 25% of the distribution of employed sequential entropy,
and lower for medium to high entropy levels. No linear relation
between entropy and insular activation was found.
The obvious discrepancy between these two studies reporting
a negative relation between insular activity and stimulus entropy
and our findings of a positive correlation calls for an explanation.
An obvious difference can be identified in the learning stages at
which participants were tested in the studies of Bornstein and
Tobia, and ours: implicit knowledge of the statistical structure and
hence the conditional entropy assigned to upcoming action steps
was already established in the present study when participants
entered the fMRI session and was kept stable throughout the
whole sessions. Though we cannot exclude that participants con-
tinued learning about the statistical structure, the situation did
not call for an acquirement of new knowledge about the under-
lying structure, but rather for further adjustments of the already
existing knowledge. In contrast, the statistical structures had to
be learnt online in the studies by Bornstein and Tobia and also
changed during the experiment. Hence, whereas upcoming action
steps in the present study were unpredictable solely because of the
underlying statistical structure of the action sequences, upcoming
stimuli in the two other studies were unpredictable because of two
factors, the probabilistic nature of the underlying structure as well
as lacking (implicit) knowledge about the nature of the structure
itself. Further studies have to evaluate if this psychological dif-
ference caused the divergent response profiles in anterior dorsal
insula.
In sum, our findings corroborate the role of dmPFC and ante-
rior dorsal insula in situations of low predictability. Crucially, par-
ticipants in the present study were not explicitly asked to engage in
predictions nor was the statistical structure of the observed action
relevant to the task. Modulations in dmPFC and anterior dorsal
insula activity therefore show that prediction is an automatically
triggered process during action observation. Moreover, statisti-
cally induced fluctuations of predictability do not have to become
conscious to participants to modulate activation in dmPFC and
anterior dorsal insula.
Based on previous findings (Strange et al., 2005; Harrison
et al., 2006; Bornstein and Daw, 2012; Schiffer et al., 2012), we
expected to find a positive correlation between the BOLD signal in
the hippocampal formation and the conditional entropy assigned
to the upcoming action step. Data did not support this hypothesis.
However, we found post-hoc a correlation between the hippocam-
pal beta-values and participants’ familiarity with the statistical
structure: the better participants had learnt the statistical struc-
ture, the stronger was the hippocampus positively correlated
with the conditional entropy (i.e., the higher was the extracted
beta-value). It has been proposed that correlation between hip-
pocampal activation and predictability reflects retrieval of mental
representations of possible events (Bornstein and Daw, 2012;
Schiffer et al., 2012), such that hippocampal activity increases
with the number (and hence unpredictability) of possible events.
The revealed finding here suggests that this correlation depended
on the degree of implicit knowledge participants had acquired.
However, given the correlational nature, the data can also be inter-
preted differently. Possibly, the correlation between conditional
entropy and hippocampal activation did not result from partic-
ipants’ higher familiarity with the statistical structure, but was a
prerequisite for it.
Note that the considered correlation was only found for the
computer post-test, but not for the paper–pencil post-test on
statistical action knowledge. We suggest that the two post-tests
engaged different processes. The computer post-test was closer to
the experimental requirements during the training and the fMRI
session, since participants were presented with a short video clip
showing the succession of two action steps. Furthermore, proba-
bility judgments were assigned to the just presented transition and
participants were not required to take the alternative transitions
into account as in the paper–pencil post-test. Thus, participants
may have reflected their judgments more in the paper–pencil
post-test, making it a more explicit knowledge test, relying also
on different memory systems.
A positive yet un-hypothesized correlation between activation
of the right lOFC and conditional entropy was revealed. Increased
activation in lOFC has previously been reported for inference
of action goals based on manipulation information (Schubotz
and von Cramon, 2008). The authors suggested that activation
of the lOFC reflects increased demands on evaluating which of
the expected action goals fits best with the observed manipula-
tion. In close keeping with this interpretation, we assume that
lOFC weighs information on currently possible action steps and
their respective probabilities to lateral andmedial PFC. According
to Wallis (2007), dlPFC and dmPFC use this information to
generate cost-benefit balanced behavioral plans. With the pro-
ceeding of the action step, further sources of information, as,
e.g., motion signals, including trajectories, hand postures, or
grip type become available. Due to its connections to sensory
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areas, the OFC can integrate this information and provide this
to dlPFC, further biasing the prediction of the action step (cf.
Wallis, 2007). Accordingly, studies on decision-making report the
lOFC for finding contingencies between stimulus-outcome asso-
ciations (Rushworth et al., 2011) as well as for facing ambiguity,
i.e., uncertainty due to missing information (Hsu et al., 2005). In
these situations, further information, provided for instance by the
reward history or somatic markers, has to be integrated to come
to a decision (Bechara et al., 2000; Hsu et al., 2005; Mushtaq et al.,
2011). Possibly, in the present study information on interoceptive
states is provided by anterior dorsal insula (Craig, 2009).
Furthermore, we found activation in the pIPS to increase
with conditional entropy. This activation points to altered atten-
tional processes under low predictability. The pIPS belongs to
the ventral frontoparietal network, as described by Corbetta and
Shulman (2002). The authors proposed that the ventral fron-
toparietal network is particularly engaged in processing of previ-
ously unattended stimuli and hence reflects an orienting response
to unexpected stimuli. Interestingly, we did not find activation in
the pIPS modulated by conditional surprisal of an action step, but
only by its conditional entropy. If conditional entropy is high, the
likelihood of a necessary reorientation rises. We therefore specu-
late that activation of the pIPS in advance to necessary reorienting
reflects a preparatory activation, dealing with the required flex-
ibility of attention focus under high conditional entropy. This
interpretation is in line with findings by Schubotz et al. (2012). In
their study, activation of the posterior parietal cortex (more pre-
cisely, the posterior AG) was revealed when detection of action
boundaries was contrasted with the detection of boundaries in
intransitive (tai chi) movements. The authors suggest that at
action boundaries, an exploration of potentially upcoming rele-
vant aspects of the scene takes place and a shifting of attention
to this spots is prepared, which is reflected in increased activation
of posterior AG. We thus suggest that during action observation,
participants’ brains exploit scenes in anticipation of an upcom-
ing reorientation of attention, resulting in a rise of activation in
posterior parietal cortex.
To sum up, we found that conditional entropy of observed
actions drew on areas known to be engaged during decision mak-
ing under uncertainty, namely the dmPFC, anterior dorsal insula,
and lOFC, as well as on the pIPS, an area that has been associated
with shifts of attention. We suggest that pIPS reflects the prepara-
tion of potential shifts of attention when the further course of the
action is rather unpredictable. Possibly, dmPFC, anterior dorsal
insula, and lOFC show integration of additional information in
order to enhance action prediction.
FINAL REMARKS
The present fMRI study focused on the exploitation of the statisti-
cal structure in observed actions. We found that two characteris-
tics can be distinguished with regard to their neural correlates.
On the one hand, low predictability of action steps calls for a
top-down modulation of attentional focus and stimulus process-
ing, reflected in higher activation in a fronto-parietal network.
On the other hand, low probability of an action step shows in
a stronger accentuation of bottom-up signals provided by the
stimulus, indicated by higher activation in parietal sites.
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